

# Daily vs. Monthly returns

*Empirical evidence from Commodity Trading Advisors*

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# Outline

- ▶ The problem
- ▶ The CTA industry
- ▶ The data set
- ▶ Daily vs. Monthly
- ▶ Pricing of fund-linked products

## Problem description

Hedge funds market themselves through monthly data but in a managed account it is possible to follow a hedge fund investment every day.

*How will the daily risk and quantitative properties experienced by the investor differ from what they expect from the monthly figures?*

# Commodity Trading Advisors



## CTA - Managed futures industry

- ▶ A 30-year-old asset class
- ▶ Chartists and trend followers
- ▶ Business legend - Turtle traders

## Industry figures

BarclayHedge CTA database collects monthly data for CTA programs. Figures from 2010 Q1 shows:

- ▶ 1058 funds totally over 20 years
- ▶ Annual return 11.6%, Sharpe ratio 0.41
- ▶ 553 active funds managing \$217.2B
- ▶ Systematic programs constitute the main part, \$169.31B



# The data set

- ▶ Daily return series from 77 CTA funds of which 65 were active
- ▶ No proforma, only live trading
- ▶ At least 2 years track record
- ▶ Mainly classic CTA strategies, mid- to -long term trend following

## Common hedge fund return biases

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  - ▶ *Start many funds, keep only the profitable, do not report until good live performance and use back-fill possibilities.*

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
- ▶ Instant history/Back-fill
  - ▶ *Start many funds, keep only the profitable, do not report until good live performance and use back-fill possibilities.*
- ▶ Selection bias
  - ▶ *Database reporting is voluntary, causing a self-selection bias*
- ▶ Survivorship bias
  - ▶ *Only the fittest survives, blow-ups are rarely reported*

## Moments

		Min	Mean	Median	Max
Daily	Mean return	-0.000178	0.000566	0.000546	0.001818
	St. deviation	0.00242	0.010767	0.00938	0.02550
	Skewness	-1.235	-0.1447	-0.1424	2.3446
	Kurtosis	3.7552	9.4731	7.093	58.3304
Monthly	Mean return	-0.0038	0.0123	0.0118	0.0752
	St. deviation	0.0109	0.0501	0.0443	0.1642
	Skewness	-0.9147	0.2686	0.1447	2.0355
	Kurtosis	1.8328	4.0179	3.3589	12.3661

**Table:** Properties of the first four moments for all managers as a group.

# Non-normality




**Figure:** *Left:* Normal probability plot of returns clearly showing the occurrence of fat tails. *Right:* Empirical distribution (blue) using a Epanechnikov kernel, together with a fitted normal distribution (red)

## Statistical tests

	Daily		Monthly	
Jacque-Berra test	100%		20%	
Lilliefors test	99%		14%	
<i>Lags</i>	1	10	1	10
Ljung-Box on returns	50%	50%	12%	26%
Ljung-Box on absolute returns	100%	100%	25%	22%
ARCH-test	90%	97.5%	17%	39%

**Table:** Percentage of funds rejecting the null hypothesis for statistical tests on daily and monthly figures.

# Autocorrelation



**Figure:** *Left:* Autocorrelation function for log-returns. *Right:* Autocorrelation for the absolute value of the log-returns. Absolute values show an irrefutable correlation, pointing towards the existence of volatility clustering.


## Pricing of fund-linked products

To illustrate the effect of non-normal higher moments we construct simulation examples using a Normal inverse Gaussian distribution:

$$\begin{aligned}dS_t &= (\mu + \beta\sigma^2(t))S_t dt + \sigma(t)S_t dB_t, \quad S_0 = s > 0, \\d\sigma_t^2 &= -\lambda\sigma_t^2 dt + dL_{\lambda t}, \quad \sigma_0^2 = y > 0,\end{aligned}$$


$B_t$  - Brownian motion,  $L_{\lambda t}$  - pure jump subordinator.

# Fixed threshold products



**Figure:** Fixed threshold product over a five years horizon. *Left:* Rate of the fund investment hitting the barrier for a range of barrier values. *Right:* Percentage increased risk of hitting the barrier when using a NIG-distribution instead of a normal distribution.

## CPPI



**Figure:** Constant proportion portfolio insurance product simulated over five years for different insurance levels and leverage factor 4. The expected result at expiry is clearly lower for a product simulated using high order moments.