

Inflation Linked Bonds: An incentive for lower inflation?

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The Basic Economic Model

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In a first order approximation the central bank's accumulated gains (in absolute real terms) over the time interval $[t; T]$ following the policy π_t is given by

$$Y_t = Y_t^n \int_t^T \tilde{a}(\pi_s - \pi_s^e) ds.$$

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$$d\pi_t^e = \gamma(\pi_t - \pi_t^e)dt \quad \text{and} \quad \pi_t = u_t + \sigma \dot{W}_t.$$

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And hence one gets

$$d\pi_t^e = \gamma(u_t - \pi_t^e)dt + \gamma\sigma dW_t.$$

and

$$dP_t = P_t\pi_t dt = P_t(u_t dt + \sigma dW_t)$$

Inflation Linked Bond and the Structuring

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Hence the liability for the bank at maturity is given by

$$-N \left(\frac{P_T - P_s}{P_s} \right) \cdot \left(\frac{P_T}{P_s} \right)^{-1} = -N \frac{P_T - P_s}{P_T} = -N \left(1 - \frac{P_s}{P_T} \right).$$

The HJB-problem

Using the instantaneous benefit and the approximation $1 - x \approx \log(x^{-1})$ for the terminal obligation we see the central bank needs to optimize

$$V(t, \pi^e, P, N) := \max_{u_v} \mathbb{E} \left(a \int_t^T e^{-r(v-t)} \left(u_v - \pi_v^e - \frac{\lambda}{2} u_v^2 \right) dv \right. \\ \left. - e^{-r(T-t)} N \log \left(\frac{P_T}{P_s} \right) \middle| \pi_t^e = \pi^e, P_t = P \right)$$

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subject to

$$d\pi_t^e = \gamma(\pi_t - \pi_t^e)dt \quad ; \quad \pi_t = u_t + \sigma \dot{W}_t.$$

and

$$V(T, \pi^e, P, N) = -N \log \left(\frac{P}{P_s} \right)$$

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This can be solved as

$$V(t, \pi^e, P, N) = -N \log \left(\frac{P}{P_s} \right) e^{-r(T-t)} + A_t \pi^e + C_t + D_t(N)$$

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with

$$A_t = \frac{a}{\gamma + r} \left(e^{-(\gamma+r)(T-t)} - 1 \right)$$

$$C_t = \frac{a}{\lambda(\gamma + r)^2} \left[\frac{r}{2} \left(1 + e^{-r(T-t)} \right) - r e^{-(\gamma+r)(T-t)} \right. \\ \left. + \frac{\gamma^2}{2(2\gamma + r)} \left(e^{-r(T-t)} - e^{-2(\gamma+r)(T-t)} \right) \right]$$

$$D_t(N) = e^{-r(T-t)} \left[\frac{N^2}{2a\lambda r} \left(1 - e^{-r(T-t)} \right) + \frac{N\sigma^2}{2} (T-t) \right. \\ \left. - \frac{N}{\lambda(\gamma + r)^2} \left(r(\gamma + r)(T-t) + \gamma \left(1 - e^{-(\gamma+r)(T-t)} \right) \right) \right].$$

Implications for Monetary Policy

So we get

$$\begin{aligned}\pi_t^*(N) &= \frac{1}{\lambda(\gamma+r)} + \left(\gamma e^{-(\gamma+r)(T-t)} + r \right) - \frac{Ne^{-r(T-t)}}{a\lambda} + \sigma \dot{W}_t, \\ \pi_t^{e^*}(N) &= \pi_s^e e^{-\gamma(t-s)} + \frac{\gamma^2 e^{-(\gamma+r)T} e^{-\gamma(t-s)}}{\lambda(\gamma+r)(2\gamma+r)} \left(e^{(2\gamma+r)t} - e^{(2\gamma+r)s} \right) \\ &+ \frac{r}{\lambda(\gamma+r)} \left(e^{\gamma t} - e^{\gamma s} \right) \\ &- \frac{N\gamma e^{-rT} e^{\gamma(t-s)}}{a\lambda(r-\gamma)} \left(e^{(r-\gamma)t} - e^{(r-\gamma)s} \right) + \gamma\sigma e^{-\gamma(t-s)} \int_s^t e^{\gamma\nu} dW_\nu.\end{aligned}$$

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Expected inflation turns negative if N is greater than

$$\frac{ar}{(1 - e^{-r(T-s)})(\gamma+r)^2} \left(r(\gamma+r)(T-s) + \gamma(1 - e^{-(\gamma+r)(T-s)}) \right).$$

Pricing

By utility indifference pricing we get

$$p_s(N) = \underbrace{e^{-r_i(T-s)}}_{\text{normal bond}} - \underbrace{P_s \left(\frac{D_s(N)}{N} \right)}_{\text{inflation compensation}}$$

for the price set by the central bank.

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- There is a nominal bond and interest rate r_i .

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Therefore the market price of risk is $\rho = \frac{m\mu - r_i}{\tilde{\sigma}}$ and under the risk free measure we have $\tilde{E}_s(P_T) = e^{-\rho(T-s)} E(P_T)$. Hence the arbitrage free price is given by

$$\tilde{p}_s(N) = e^{-(r_i + \sigma\rho)(T-s)} E_s(P_T^*(N)) = e^{-r_i(T-s)} P_s e^{\int_s^T (u_\nu^*(N) - \frac{1}{2}\sigma^2) d\nu + \int_s^T \sigma d\tilde{W}_\nu}$$

Some simulation




Figure: There is excess demand for ILB's whenever the Bank chooses $N \leq 4.067 * 10^8$. Supply meets demand when $N = 4.067 * 10^8$.

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


Figure: The number of ILB's the bank can issue changes in time to maturity and first becomes positive for approx. 6.5. However the equilibrium N will never lead to an expected constant price level (red line is always above the blue line).

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


Figure: with slightly other parameters the situation changes dramatically. When issuing the equilibrium N ILB's with time to maturity of about 3 we observe decreasing expected price level.