In this paper, we examine vaccination decisions within a behavioral game theoretical framework that accounts for values as well as cognitive dissonance. Our focus is on the conditions that give rise to different equilibrium vaccination rates both when individuals differ in moral and social values but hold the same views about vaccination and, separately, when they hold different views but have the same values. Within this theoretical framework, we assess the impact of interventions such as lockdowns, vaccination restrictions, and monetary rewards. Overall, we find that lockdowns are not as effective at increasing vaccination rates as restrictions and rewards and may end up backfiring. Lockdowns penalize everyone equally, regardless of the vaccination status, and may crowd out intrinsic motivation for vaccinating by curtailing socializing opportunities. Instead, vaccination restrictions and monetary rewards entail a larger cost on the non-vaccinated or a larger benefit on the vaccinated, thus incentivizing vaccination and enhancing the impact of values. While both restrictions and rewards can crowd in intrinsic motives, thus inducing more people to vaccinate, the former provide an additional stimulus to social values and are thus more effective in all instances but when the only hindrance to the herd immunity vaccination rate is cognitive dissonance in the presence of value heterogeneity.

* This work received financial support from the Fields Institute, Mathematics for Public Health program, which is funded through the Emerging Infectious Diseases Modelling (EIDM) Initiative supported by NSERC and PHAC.

The paper can be found here: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4591079